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ABSTRACT
Both the UK spot and futures markets in short term interest rates are found
to react strongly to surprises in the scheduled announcements of the repo
rate and RPI. Therefore these announcements should also affect the market
for options on short term interest rates. Because the repo rate and RPI
announcements are scheduled, the options market can predict the days on
which announcement shocks may hit, and build this information into its
volatility expectations. A theoretical model is constructed where the
volatility used in pricing options alters over time in a predictable non-linear
manner that varies with contract maturity and the number of forthcoming
announcements; but is independent of announcement content. The empirical
results support the response coefficients of this theoretical model, and it is
concluded that the UK spot, futures and options markets in short term
interest rates are semi-strong efficient. 
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The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England was set up on 6
th May
1997 and entrusted with setting UK interest rates (Budd, 1998). The MPC meets monthly,
and at 12 noon on the scheduled day (usually the Thursday following the first Monday in
each calendar month), announces the level at which they have set interest rates until their
next meeting. The MPC has the policy objective of adjusting UK interest rates to achieve
the target level of inflation specified by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. MPC decisions
are a major instrument of the government’s macroeconomic policy, and have an important
influence on the UK economy.
Scheduled announcements (such as those of the MPC) have a different effect from
unscheduled announcements on market volatility, and this is the first study to trace the
impact of MPC interest rate announcements through the three markets: spot, futures and
options. The main focus of this research is on the effect of MPC announcements on the
anticipated volatility of interest rate futures contracts implied in the price of options on
interest rate futures. This research is the first to model the effects of contract maturity on
this relationship, and the first to allow for more than one outstanding scheduled
announcement (which may be of several different types). It is demonstrated that implied
volatility is only affected by the anticipated announcement day volatility, and not by the
actual content of the announcement. It is also shown that movements in implied volatility
(and hence options prices) are predictable, and that this is consistent with semi-strong
market efficiency. Finally, the analysis provides a possible explanation for the volatility
term structure.
In section 1 the effect of MPC and seven other macroeconomic announcements on spot
interest rates (LIBOR) is studied, while in section 2, the impact of these announcements
on the interest rate futures market is analysed. The two scheduled macroeconomic2
announcements identified in sections 1 and 2 as having a significant effect on spot and
futures interest rates (the repo rate and the retail price index) are then used in section 3 to
investigate the effect on the interest rate options market. A model is developed where the
effect of a scheduled announcement on the options market is a non-linear function of
option maturity, as well as the number of outstanding scheduled announcements and the
volatility expected on their release. This model is then tested and found to be consistent
with the data. It is also shown that the reaction of the options market is unaffected by the
size of the announcement surprises. Finally, section 4 contains the conclusions. 
1. The Effect of Scheduled Announcements on Short Term Interest Rates
The MPC sets the repo rate
1 which is the interest rate implicit in the prices at which the
Bank of England is prepared to buy assets from a bank and sell them back to the same
bank about two weeks later. This rate sets the minimum cost of short term bank funds and,
to the extent that any change in the repo rate is not absorbed by a change in the mark-up
charged by banks to their customers, directly affects short term interest rates. Since the
MPC meets once a month, their announcements determine the repo rate for the next
month. In addition to a direct effect on short term interest rates, a change in the repo rate
may also affect longer term interest rates via its effect on expectations of future short term
rates.
This link in the transmission of monetary policy is examined by studying the effect of
repo rate changes announced by the MPC on 3 month LIBOR rates for sterling deposits.
Daily changes
2 in LIBOR (!Lt) were regressed on a set of nine macroeconomic variables:
unexpected increases in the repo rate (U!MPCt
+)
3, unexpected decreases in the repo rate
(U!MPCt
!), unexpected changes in the index of production (U!IPt), unexpected changes
in the retail price index (U!RPIt), unexpected changes in the money supply (U!M4t),
unexpected changes in consumer credit (U!CCt), unexpected changes in earnings (U!Et),
unexpected changes in producer prices (U!PPt), and unexpected changes in retail sales
(U!RSt). In addition, the first and second lags of the dependent variable were also3
included in the regression equation
4. These scheduled macroeconomic announcements
were chosen to include economic factors thought likely to affect LIBOR, and to minimise
the inclusion of announcements that occur on the same day as other announcements
included in the model.
The contributor banks input their rates for LIBOR between 11:00 am and 11:10 am, while
the other macroeconomic variables are announced at 9:30 am. Therefore LIBOR should
reflect any macroeconomic announcements made earlier in the morning. However, since
the repo rate is announced at noon, this can only be reflected in the following day’s
LIBOR rate, and so the MPC variables (U!MPCt
+, U!MPCt
!) were lagged by one day.
The estimated regression equation is:-
!Lt = " + #1U!MPCt!1
+ +#2U!MPCt!1
! + #3U!IPt + #4U!RPIt + #5U!M4t +
#6U!CCt + #7U!Et + #8U!PPt + #9U!RSt + #10U!Lt!1 + #11U!Lt!2 + $t (1)
where %
2
$(t) = {"0 + "1$
2
t!1 + "2%
2
$(t!1)}{1+"3D1, t!1}
where D1, t!1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity one day after an MPC
announcement. A multiplicative GARCH (1,1) estimation procedure was adopted to
model the periodic breaks in the volatility structure caused by the monthly MPC
announcements, (Li and Engle, 1998, and Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine, 1998). The
appropriateness of using this regime-switching specification will be examined by testing
the significance of "3. 
Assuming that a change in the repo rate causes the same change in all the rates at the short
end of the yield curve
5, an unexpected change in the repo rate is predicted to lead to a
similar effect on LIBOR, i.e. #1 = #2 = 1 (hypothesis 1). Using the LM test (Engle, 1982),
the error term of equation (1) was found to be ARCH, while the Jarque-Bera test statistic
indicated non-normality at an extremely high level of significance. Therefore equation (1)
was estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood techniques of Bollerslev and4
Woodridge (1992). This estimator gives consistent estimates and valid standard errors for
GARCH models with lagged dependent variables and non-normal disturbances. The
results for equation (1) are shown in table 1
6.
Coefficient z statistic Probabilit
y
Constant   0.000281   0.361 0.7184
U!MPCt!1
+      0.680228
**   5.413 0.0000
U!MPCt!1
!      0.479339
** 11.414 0.0000
U!RPIt      0.090992
**   3.319 0.0010
U!IPt      0.021237
*   2.080 0.0375
U!M4t !0.002888 !0.618 0.5363
U!CCt !0.009633 !1.049 0.2940
U!Et    0.024234   1.089 0.2761
U!PPt  !0.026905 !1.163 0.2449
U!RSt    0.009165   1.373 0.1699
U!Lt!1      0.137072
**   3.512 0.0004
U!Lt!2       0.142457
**   3.668 0.0002
Conditional Variance Equation (GARCH(1,1))
Constant ("0)       0.000273
**  7.029 0.0000
ARCH ("1)      0.266473
*  2.506 0.0122
GARCH ("2)     0.047739  0.772 0.4399
Multiplicative ("3)      7.906363
*  2.227 0.0260
Table 1: Effect of Unexpected Changes in Macro Variables on LIBOR
Equation (1) was estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood techniques of Bollerslev
and Woodridge (1992). The dependent variable is the change in LIBOR (!Lt). The
explanatory variables are the unexpected increases in the repo rate (U!MPCt
+),
unexpected decreases in the repo rate (U!MPCt
!), unexpected changes in the index of
production (U!IPt), unexpected changes in the retail price index (U!RPIt),unexpected
changes in the money supply (U!M4t), unexpected changes in consumer credit (U!CCt),
unexpected changes in earnings (U!Et), unexpected changes in producer prices (U!PPt),
unexpected changes in retail sales (U!RSt), and lagged values of the dependent variable.
** = significant at the 1% level, * = significant at the 5% level. Number of observations
= 675. Adjusted R
2 = 0.554, the Q-statistics are insignificant at all lags from 1 to 36,
Jarque-Bera = 387. 
The results in table 1 show that the constant term ("0) is close to zero, implying that if
there is no unexpected change in any explanatory variable, there is no change in LIBOR.
The significant values of "1 and "3 indicate a strong multiplicative ARCH effect, while
the GARCH term is not significant. On MPC announcement days volatility is nine times
(i.e. 1+"3) larger than otherwise. Changes in LIBOR are largely caused by unexpected
changes in the repo rate set by the MPC. Unexpected increases in the repo rate have a5
larger positive effect on LIBOR than do unexpected decreases, and this difference is
significant at the 1% level. This asymmetry could be due to banks quickly passing on an
increase in their costs, but acting more slowly in passing on a reduction in their costs. The
other significant explanatory variables (index of production, RPI and the lagged values
of changes in LIBOR) have much smaller coefficients. The positive relationship between
the RPI and LIBOR is consistent with a link between inflation and interest rates, while the
positive effect of the index of production accords with higher levels of production
increasing the demand for funds.
The values of both #1 and #2 are significantly smaller than one, and so hypothesis 1 is
rejected. The average effect of an MPC announcement on LIBOR is a bit over half the
size of the surprise, and this accords with the empirical findings of Kuttner (2000), who
found that an unexpected change of 1% in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
target rate leads to a 0.504% change in the US 3-month Treasury bill rate. Bomfim and
Reinhart (2000) found an even lower response of 0.25% for unexpected changes in the
FOMC target rate. 
There are two possible explanations for this apparent under-response by LIBOR. First,
when an expected change in the repo rate does not occur in the current MPC
announcement, it is likely that the predicted change is now expected to occur in a
subsequent MPC announcement. Since LIBOR relates to a 3 month period, such a
situation results in LIBOR changing by less than the surprise in the MPC announcement
7.
A similar argument applies when a change in the repo rate occurs earlier than expected.
Second, the expectations data used in the analysis may not correctly quantify market
expectations at noon on the day before the announcement. This may be because the
expectations survey is carried out 7 days before the announcement and market
expectations become more accurate between then and the day before the announcement;
or because there is sampling error in the expectations survey. 6
2. The Effect of Scheduled Announcements on Short Sterling Futures Prices
There have been a number of previous studies of the effect of spot interest rates on interest
rate futures prices. Buckle, et. al. (1998) found Short Sterling futures had a higher
volatility between 9:50 am and 9:55 am on days when unscheduled changes in the Bank
of England base rate
8 were announced. Slovin, Sushka and Waller (1994) found that the
announcement of changes in the prime interest rate charged by US banks immediately
affected the price of US treasury bill futures. While these announcements were
unscheduled, they show the price sensitivity of futures on government interest rates to
changes in spot interest rates. Li and Engle (1998) found that the unexpected component
of scheduled macroeconomic announcements affects returns and the volatility of returns
on US Treasury bond futures.
LIFFE trades Short Sterling futures whose underlying asset is LIBOR for 3 month Sterling
deposits. The near futures contracts have a maturity of 1, 2 or 3 months, and so the current
futures price reflects expectations of the spot LIBOR rate for 3 months, starting in 1, 2 or
3 months time, i.e. the forward rate. News announcements directly affect both the spot rate
and the forward rate. In addition, the spot LIBOR rate is linked to the LIBOR forward rate
via arbitrage
9,10. Since LIBOR and Sterling futures prices are determined by a similar
information set, daily changes in the futures price (!Ft) were regressed on the same set
of explanatory variables that was used for LIBOR (excluding the lagged values of the
dependent variable)
11. Since the futures price observations are made after the noon
announcements of the repo rate, there is no need to lag the MPC announcements.
!Ft = " + #1U!MPCt
+ +#2U!MPCt
! + #3U!IPt + #4U!RPIt + #5U!M4t + #6U!CCt
+ #7U!Et + #8U!PPt + #9U!RSt + $t (2)
where %
2
$(t) = {"0 + "1$
2
t!1 + "2%
2
$(t!1)}{1+"3D1, t} 
An unexpected change in the repo rate is again predicted to lead to a similar effect on the
rate of return implicit in the price of Short Sterling futures, i.e. #1 = #2 = !1 (hypothesis7
2)
12. Using the Engle (1982) LM test, the error terms of this equation were found to be
ARCH at the 2.4% significance level, while the errors were highly non-normal. Therefore,
as for LIBOR, the quasi-maximum likelihood techniques of Bollerslev and Woodridge
(1992) were used. The results for equation (2) are shown in table 2
13.
Coefficient z statistic Probabilit
y
Constant  !0.000240 !0.192 0.8474
U!MPCt
+     !0.894761
** !6.513 0.0000
U!MPCt
!     !0.544276
** !4.781 0.0000
U!RPIt     !0.218661
** !2.620 0.0088
U!IPt   !0.015144 !0.912 0.3618
U!M4t    0.004941   0.678 0.4981
U!CCt   !0.042974
* !2.268 0.0233
U!Et     !0.066432
* !2.260 0.0238
U!PPt     0.018925   0.527 0.5976
U!RSt     !0.023267
* !2.033 0.0421
Conditional Variance Equation (GARCH(1,1))
Constant ("0)       0.000994
**   9.646 0.0000
ARCH ("1)       0.130588
**   2.739 0.0062
GARCH ("2) !0.065886 !1.155 0.2481
Multiplicative ("3)      4.538621
**   2.977 0.0029
Table 2: Effect of Unexpected Changes in Macro Variables on Short Sterling Futures
Equation (2) was estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood techniques of Bollerslev
and Woodridge (1992). The dependent variable is the change in the price of Short
Sterling futures LIBOR (!Ft). The explanatory variables are the unexpected increases in
the repo rate (U!MPCt
+), unexpected decreases in the repo rate (U!MPCt
!), unexpected
changes in the index of production (U!IPt), unexpected changes in the retail price index
(U!RPIt), unexpected changes in the money supply (U!M4t), unexpected changes in
consumer credit (U!CCt), unexpected changes in earnings (U!Et), unexpected changes
in producer prices (U!PPt), unexpected changes in retail sales (U!RSt), and lagged
values of the dependent variable. ** = significant at the 1% level, * = significant at the
5% level. Number of observations = 675. Adjusted R
2 = 0.295, the Q-statistics are
insignificant at all lags from 1 to 36, Jarque-Bera = 15.0.
Table 2 shows that, as for LIBOR, the constant term ("0) is close to zero, implying that
if there is no unexpected change in any explanatory variable, there is no change in the
price of Short Sterling futures. There is again a strong multiplicative ARCH effect in the
errors, and the volatility on the day of an MPC announcement is 5.5 times larger than
otherwise. The main cause of changes in Short Sterling futures prices is unexpected MPC8
announcements. Allowing for the sign change, the coefficients for positive and negative
MPC surprises are similar to those found above for LIBOR, with positive MPC
announcements having a bigger effect than negative announcements in each case.
Unexpected changes in the RPI again have a significant effect (with the sign reversed),
and the magnitude of this effect has more than doubled. This relationship is consistent
with a positive link between inflation and interest rates. Unexpected changes in earnings,
consumer credit and retail sales, all of which are associated with a more buoyant
economy, have a small but significant effect. 
The coefficient for positive MPC surprises is significantly different from the coefficient
for negative surprises, but not significantly different from one; while that for negative
MPC surprises is significantly below one. Thus, there is again an asymmetric response to
MPC surprises, and hypothesis 2 is rejected for negative surprises, but accepted for
positive surprises.
Overall, the empirical results for LIBOR and Short Sterling futures clearly indicate that
the most powerful influence on each is unexpected changes in the repo rate announced by
the MPC; with positive MPC surprises having a larger effect than negative MPC surprises.
Apart from positive surprises on Short Sterling futures, the effect of surprises in MPC
announcements on LIBOR and Short Sterling futures is less than one. This may be
because the change in the repo rate occurred earlier or later than expected, or because the
expectations data used in the analysis does not correctly quantify market expectations at
noon on the day before the announcement. In addition, both LIBOR and Short Sterling
futures are also affected by unexpected changes in the RPI, while LIBOR is affected by
unexpected changes in the index of production, and Short Sterling futures are affected by
unexpected changes in earnings, consumer credit and retail sales.
3. The Effects of Scheduled Announcements on Short Sterling Options 
As well as affecting the spot and futures markets, announcements also affect the price of9
options written on the spot asset concerned. The volatility of the underlying asset is a
major determinant of the options price, with increases in volatility leading to an increase
in the price of both call and put options. Therefore, options prices can be used to study the
effect of announcements on spot volatility using the volatilities implied by the options
price. 
Previous empirical studies have found that a wide variety of announcements affect the
volatility implied in options prices. Some of these studies have analysed various scheduled
announcements: twelve macroeconomic announcements (Ederington and Lee, 1996), three
macroeconomic announcements (Li & Engle, 1998), company earnings (Patell &
Wolfson, 1979, 1981, Donders & Vorst, 1996, Copeland, Poon & Stapleton, 2000), the
balance of trade (Madura & Tucker, 1992), the money supply (Bailey, 1988), a general
election (Gemmill, 1992) and interest rate changes (Bomfim & Reinhart, 2000). Other
studies have looked at the effects of unscheduled announcements on implied volatility:
ten major news announcements (Cornell, 1978), takeovers (Barone-Adesi, Brown &
Harlow, 1994), mergers (Jayaraman et al, 1991, Levy & Yoder, 1993), interest rate
changes (French & Fraser, 1986), the effect of the Louvre Accord on volatility in currency
markets (Tucker & Madura, 1991), central bank intervention in the foreign exchange
market (Bonser-Neal, 1996, Bonser-Neal & Tanner, 1996) and dividend increases
(Jayaraman & Shastri, 1993). Finally, a few studies have looked at the announcement
(unscheduled) and the ex-date (scheduled) effects of stock splits (French & Dubofsky,
1986, Klein & Peterson, 1988, Sheikh, 1989).
This section examines the effect of scheduled announcements on the implied volatility of
options on Short Sterling futures. The option pricing model used to compute the implied
volatilities is presented; followed by a discussion of the equivalence between the implied
volatility and the average anticipated volatility over the remaining life of the option. After
an intuitive statement of the relationship between time to expiry and anticipated volatility,
a mathematical approach is used to derive this relationship. Finally, this theoretical10
relationship is tested by fitting it to daily data for Short Sterling options for 1997-1999.
In contrast to some earlier papers (e.g. Bailey, 1988, Bomfim & Reinhart, 2000 and
Madura & Tucker, 1992), the model does not use the size of the actual or surprise
announcement to explain movements in implied volatility; and the validity of this
approach is also tested. 
A. Option Pricing Model
LIFFE, which uses futures-style margining for all its options contracts, trades American
style options on Short Sterling futures. While these options are American rather than
European style, this is of no consequence because, as Chen and Scott (1993) have shown,
it is never optimal to exercise early an American style option on an interest rate future
with futures-style margining. Therefore these options can be priced as though they are
European style. While there are a number of possible pricing models, one of the most
popular models for pricing options on futures is the Black (1976) model. The Black model
can be modified for pricing options on interest rate futures to allow for futures-style
margining and the convention that Short Sterling futures prices are quoted as deviations
from 100. This model is:- 
Ci = (100!K)N(%i!t!di)!(100!Fi)N(!di) (3)
where di = [ln((100!Fi)/(100!K))+0.5%i
2t]/%i!t
Ci is the current price of the call option, Fi is the current price of Short Sterling futures,
K is the exercise (or strike) price, t is the time to expiry in years, %i is the standard
deviation of the annualized yield on a futures contract (i.e. the annualized standard
deviation of ln[(100!Ft)/(100!Ft!1)]) and N(di) is the probability that a standardised
normally distributed random variable is less than or equal to di.
This option pricing model can be used to compute the volatility implied by any call price.
Rather than use a single strike price, the implied volatilities were computed using the11
Black model as the equally weighted average of the implied volatilities for the put and call
options nearest to the money. Corrado and Miller (1996) argue that this way of computing
implied volatilities performs as well as, or better than, any other method. The implied
volatilities were computed using trading days, as suggested by French (1984), rather than
calendar days.
B. Average Anticipated Volatility
The Black-Scholes (1973) and Black (1976) option pricing models assume that the
volatility of the underlying asset is constant over time, which is not the case when there
are scheduled price-sensitive announcements. As shown in the results above for LIBOR
and Short Sterling futures, volatility is significantly higher on days with MPC
announcements ("3 is significant); while in the analysis below it is argued that scheduled
announcements induce deterministic patterns into the average anticipated volatility.
However, Merton (1973) argued that, if the anticipated variance of returns on the
underlying asset is a deterministic function of a known variable (e.g. time), the Black-
Scholes (1973) (and Black, 1976) models remain valid, and the variance implied by the
options price is equal to the average anticipated variance over the remaining life of the
option
14 
15. 
In addition to a deterministic pattern, it is likely that the volatility of the underlying asset
has an additional stochastic component. This may be because the content of the scheduled
announcements is unpredictable, or because there are unscheduled announcements. If
volatility is stochastic, the implied volatility computed using the Black-Scholes (1973)
model tends to understate the true average anticipated volatility until expiry for at-the-
money options, and this effect increases in size as the time to expiry lengthens, Hull and
White (1987). However, as Hull and White have shown, these biases appear to be small
(e.g. under 2%). In addition, since the empirical analysis below uses the proportionate
change in volatility, and all the volatilities are biased in the same direction; any such bias
in measuring volatility levels will tend to cancel out. Furthermore, Heynen, Kemna &12
Vorst (1992) show that if volatility follows a mean reverting, GARCH or EGARCH
process, the Black-Scholes implied volatility for at-the-money options is a very accurate
approximation to the average anticipated volatility. 
C. The Theoretical Effects of Scheduled Announcements on Volatility 
Consideration will now be given to the effect of scheduled announcements on the average
anticipated volatility. Given the equivalence of the volatility implied by solving equation
(3) and the average anticipated volatility during the remaining life of the option, the
effects of scheduled announcements on the average anticipated volatility also apply to
implied volatility. As shown in sections 1 and 2, some macroeconomic announcements
(principally MPC and RPI)  are important determinants of LIBOR and the price of Short
Sterling futures. It was also found that the volatility of LIBOR and Short Sterling futures
prices is higher on announcement than non-announcement days. In consequence, the
average anticipated volatility until expiry for Short Sterling futures must allow for the
increase in volatility from scheduled macroeconomic announcements.
Each day the average anticipated volatility for the remaining life of the option is computed
over one less day. When the excluded day is an announcement day, the average
anticipated volatility over the remaining life of the option tends to drop. However, when
the excluded day is a non-announcement day, and there will be a scheduled announcement
before expiry, the average anticipated volatility rises. When there are many days to expiry,
the exclusion of a single day from computing the average anticipated volatility until
expiry has a fairly small effect. However, when expiry is only a few days away, dropping
a day has a much larger effect because the averaging is over far fewer days. After the last
scheduled announcement before expiry, the average anticipated volatility is unaffected by
the exclusion of the remaining non-announcement days because they all have the same
anticipated volatility. The pattern of movements in implied volatility produced by these
arguments is illustrated in figure 1.14
The above arguments will now be presented in a more formal way, leading to a regression
equation which can be used to test the model. Both the spot and futures markets have been
shown to be  affected by MPC and RPI announcements, and these announcements have
a much bigger effect on each of these markets than any of the other scheduled
announcements. Therefore, the theory will be developed and tested for two scheduled
announcements, although it could be generalised to n announcements in a straightforward
manner. If the expected volatility of the underlying asset for days on which there is an
MPC announcement is %a
2, that for other scheduled announcement (e.g. RPI) days is %b
2,
that for non-announcement days is %na
2, and assuming that these expected volatilities of
the underlying asset are not altered in a consistent manner by actual announcements
17,
then on day t the average anticipated volatility between now and expiry is:-
%t
2 = (mt%na
2 + kt%b
2 + nt%a
2)/Tt (4)
where mt is the remaining number of non-announcement days before expiry, nt is the
remaining number of MPC announcements, kt is the number of other price sensitive
scheduled announcements, Tt is the number of days to expiry (kt+mt+nt " Tt)
18, and %t
2 is
the average anticipated volatility until expiry, given the information available on day t. If
there is no scheduled announcement on day t, then:- 
 
%t!1
2 = ((mt+1)%na
2 + kt%b
2 + nt%a
2)/(Tt+1) (5)
and so the proportionate change in the average anticipated volatility on day t is:-
(%t
2!%t!1
2)/%t!1
2 = [nt(%a
2!%na
2) + kt(%b
2!%na
2)]/[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)] (6)
If there is a scheduled MPC announcement on day t then:-
%t!1
2 = (mt%na
2 + kt%b
2 + (nt+1)%a
2)/(Tt+1) (7)15
and so the proportionate change in the average anticipated volatility on day t is:-
 ( %t
2!%t!1
2)/%t!1
2 = [mt(%na
2!%a
2) + kt(%b
2!%a
2)]/[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)] (8)
If there is another type of scheduled announcement on day t, then:-
%t!1
2 = (mt%na
2 + (kt+1)%b
2 + nt%a
2)/(Tt+1) (9)
and so the proportionate change in the average anticipated volatility on day t is:-
 ( %t
2!%t!1
2)/%t!1
2 = [mt(%na
2!%b
2) + nt(%a
2!%b
2)]/[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)] (10)
Letting x = (%a
2!%na
2), y = (%b
2!%na
2) and z = (%a
2!%b
2), equations (6), (8) and (10) give:-
(%t
2!%t!1
2)/%t!1
2 = [{xnt+ykt}D3t !{mtx+ktz}D1t + {ntz!mty}D2t]/[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)] (11)
where  D1t, D2t  and D 3t are zero-one dummies indicating MPC, other scheduled
announcements and no announcements respectively. The relationships between the
dummy variables and the dependent variable are non-linear and time varying. For
example, when the time to expiry is long, Tt(Tt+1) is large and the effect of an
announcement on volatility is small. 
The coefficients in equation (11) show that when a non-announcement day is dropped for
any given Tt, the absolute size of the effect is bigger when there are more scheduled
announcements (nt+kt) to come. If there are no subsequent scheduled announcements
(nt+kt= 0), the effect is zero. The total effect of dropping a non-announcement day on the
proportionate change in the average anticipated volatility is given by (xnt
+ykt)/[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)]. Because both x and y are positive, average anticipated volatility
increases when there is no scheduled announcement, (hypothesis 3). 16
The total effect of dropping an MPC announcement day on the proportionate change in
the average anticipated volatility is given by !(xmt+zkt)/[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)]. As %na
2<%a
2, x
should be positive. The coefficient z can be positive or negative; but will probably be
absolutely smaller than x. In consequence, the effect of dropping an MPC announcement
will probably be negative; although it could be positive if z is strongly negative and kt is
large
19. Due to the incorporation of more than one type of scheduled announcement, this
result conflicts with the conclusion of previous studies that this effect is unambiguously
negative. Hypothesis 4 is that MPC announcements have a negative effect on the volatility
implied by options prices.
Finally, the total effect of dropping the other type of scheduled announcement on the
proportionate change in the average anticipated volatility is (ntz!mty)/[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)], and
this will tend to be negative, although it could be positive if nt and z are large. Hypothesis
5 is that other announcements have a negative effect on the volatility implied by options
prices.
D. Empirical Testing of the Model
The model developed above of the effects of scheduled announcements on volatility was
tested using daily data for call and put options on Short Sterling futures for May 1997 to
December 1999. Fifteen trading days before expiry, the data series was rolled from the
near contract into the next near contract
20. 
The values of the terms kt, mt, nt, D1t, D2t, D3t and Tt in equation (11) are known with
certainty, while estimates of x, y, z and %t!1
2 are available
21, 
22. The direction of the effect
of announcements on volatility was examined by fitting equation (12) using GARCH (1,1)
and the quasi-maximum likelihood techniques of Bollerslev and Woodridge (1992). 
(%t
2!%t!1
2)/%t!1
2 = " + #1D1t + #2D2t + #3(%t!1
2!%t!2
2)/%t!2
2 + &t (12)17
D1t and D2t  are dummies representing MPC and RPI announcements, and &t is a
disturbance term. The lagged dependent variable (LDV) was included to deal with
negative autocorrelation
23. The results appear in table 3
24. They show that on days with
no announcement volatility rises by 1.09%, on average; and so hypothesis 3 is confirmed.
On days with an MPC announcement volatility falls by an average of (15.34!1.09) =
14.25%, supporting hypothesis 4. On days with an RPI announcement volatility falls by
an average of (5.66!1.09) = 4.57%, which is consistent with hypothesis 5.
Coefficient z statistic Probabilit
y
Constant (")    0.010876
**   2.631 0.0085
MPC (D1t) !0.153411
** !5.137 0.0000
RPI (D2t) !0.056558
** !2.846 0.0044
LDV !0.179500
** !5.090 0.0000
Conditional Variance Equation ((GARCH(1,1))
Constant ("0)  0.003755
** 2.793 0.0052
ARCH ("1)  0.251335
** 4.480 0.0000
GARCH ("2)  0.497213
** 4.327 0.0000
Table 3: Average Effects of Two Types of Announcement on Volatility 
Equation (12) was estimated using GARCH (1,1) and the quasi-maximum likelihood
techniques of Bollerslev and Woodridge (1992). The dependent variable is the
proportionate change in the average anticipated volatility (%t
2!%t!1
2)/%t!1
2. The explanatory
variables are dummy variables for MPC announcements (D1t) and other scheduled
announcements (D2t), and the lagged dependent variable (LDV). The constant term (")
represents no scheduled announcements. ** = significantly different from zero at the 1%
level, * = significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Number of observations =
675. Adjusted R
2 = 0.248. DW = 2.08, Jarque-Bera = 37.34.
Next the validity of the theory underlying equation (11), which specifies the size of the
effect which different types of announcement have on the proportionate change in the
average anticipated volatility, was investigated. Letting ’t =
!{mtx+ktz}D1t/[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)],  (t = {ntz!mty}D2t /[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)] and )t =
{xnt+ykt}D3t/[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)] and including a constant, a disturbance term and the lagged
dependent variable, equation (11) becomes:-
(%t
2!%t!1
2)/%t!1
2 = " + #1’t + #2(t + #3)t + #4(%t!1
2!%t!2
2)/%t!2
2 + *t (13)18
Equation (13) was fitted to the data using GARCH (1,1) and the quasi-maximum
likelihood techniques of Bollerslev and Woodridge (1992). The results are set out in table
4
25. 
Coefficient z statistic Probabilit
y
Constant !0.004740 !0.809 0.4184
MPC (’t)     1.900573
*    2.080 0.0376
RPI ((t)     1.728491
*   2.558 0.0105
None ()t)      3.438160
**   2.722 0.0065
LDV    !0.185859
** !5.347 0.0000
Conditional Variance Equation ((GARCH(1,1))
Constant ("0)    0.003123
*   2.093 0.0364
ARCH ("1)     0.168483
**   3.949 0.0001
GARCH ("2)     0.621469
**   5.575 0.0000
Table 4: Effect of Two Types of Scheduled Announcement on Volatility 
Equation (13) was estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood techniques of
Bollerslev and Woodridge (1992). The dependent variable is the proportionate change
in the average anticipated volatility (%t
2!%t!1
2)/%t!1
2. The explanatory variables are the
effect of MPC (’t), other scheduled announcements ((t), no scheduled announcements
()t) and the lagged dependent variable (LDV). ** = significantly different from zero at
the 1% level, * = significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Number of
observations = 675. Adjusted R
2 = 0.223. DW = 2.07, Jarque-Bera = 113.47.
If the theory in equation (11) is correct, the estimated regression coefficients (#1, #2 and
#3) should be unity - hypothesis 6. In addition, the constant term included in equation (13)
(") should be zero - hypothesis 7. As expected, the constant term is not significantly
different from zero and hypothesis 7 is accepted. The estimated coefficients for MPC and
RPI announcements are clearly not significantly different from one, suggesting that these
announcements have a non-linear, time-varying effect on the implied volatility, as
specified by ’t and (t. For non-announcement days, the estimated effect is not
significantly different from one at the 5% level, which is also consistent with the theory
that the implied volatility rises by )t on non-announcement days. Therefore, hypothesis
6 is accepted.
E. Implied Volatility and the Size of the Announcements
The theoretical model ignores the size of the actual or surprise announcement, because it19
was assumed that the average anticipated volatility is independent of the size of current
MPC and RPI surprises. This lack of dependence was tested by regressing the squared
errors from equation (13) on MPC, *tm
2, and RPI, *tp
2, announcement days on  the squared
values of the unexpected changes in the repo rate and the RPI, i.e. U!MPCt
2 and U!RPIt
2.
The independence assumption is supported if there is no connection between the size of
the announcement surprises and the volatility errors -  hypothesis 8. Separate regressions
were fitted for the MPC and RPI announcements, as specified in equations (14a) and
(14b).
*tm
2 =  "m + #mU!MPCt
2 + +tm (14a)
*tp
2  =  "p + #pU!RPIt
2 + +tp (14b)
The results are contained in table 5 
26. They show no association between the squared
volatility errors and the squared announcement surprises for either MPC or RPI
announcements, supporting the independence assumption made above.
Coefficient t statistic Probabilit
y
Equation (14b) MPC
Constant ("m)      0.046291
**    3.014 0.0053
U!MPCt
2 (#m) !0.298475 !0.665 0.5111
Equation (14b) RPI
Constant ("p)      0.016393
** 3.536 0.0013
U!RPIt
2 (#p)    0.078211 0.400 0.6919
Table 5: Announcement Surprises and Volatility Errors 
Equations (14a) and (14b) were estimated using ordinary least squares. The dependent
variable is the squared error from equation (13) on either MPC or RPI announcement
days. The explanatory variable is the squared surprise in either the MPC or RPI
announcement. ** = significantly different from zero at the 1% level, * = significantly
different from zero at the 5% level. For equation (14a): number of observations = 31,
adjusted R
2 = !0.019, Jarque-Bera = 42.88. For equation (14b): number of observations
= 32, adjusted R
2 = !0.028, Jarque-Bera = 11.93.
Regressions where the variables in equation (14) are not squared or unsigned also find no
significant relationships. This indicates that including the size of the announcement
surprises in equation (13) would not improve the fit, and supports the theoretical model20
which argues that the volatility is affected by the announcement event, and not by its
content.
4. Conclusions
The impact of the scheduled MPC and other macroeconomic announcements was traced
through the spot, futures and options markets in UK short term interest rates. It was found
that both the spot and futures markets react strongly to surprises in the repo rate and the
RPI, and that price volatility rises on these days. The response of these two markets to
repo rate surprise announcements by the MPC  is asymmetric, with a bigger reaction for
positive surprises; and the response co-efficient is usually less than unity. This apparent
under-response may be because the expected change in the repo rate is now expected at
either of the next two MPC meetings, or because expectations become more accurate in
the seven days between being observed and the MPC meeting. 
Since surprise repo rate and RPI announcements have a powerful influence on the spot
and futures markets, they should also affect the market for options on short term interest
rates. A key determinant of the options price is the expected volatility of returns on the
underlying asset. Because the repo rate and RPI announcements are scheduled, the options
market can predict the days on which announcement shocks may hit and build this
information into its volatility expectations. A theoretical model was constructed which
states that the volatility used in pricing options alters over time in a predictable non-linear
manner that varies with contract maturity and the number of forthcoming announcements,
but is independent of the size of the announcement. The data reveals that MPC
announcements lead to a substantial decrease in the implied volatility, RPI announcements
result in a smaller decrease, and no scheduled announcement is associated with a small
increase in the implied volatility. The data is consistent with the response coefficients of
the theoretical model. 
The model developed in this paper explains why options that differ only in their expiry21
1. A repo or “sale and repurchase agreement” can apply to Sterling treasury bills, UK
government foreign currency debt, eligible bank and local authority bills, certain Sterling bonds
issued by supranational organizations and by governments in the European Economic Area,
(Monetary Policy Committee, 1999).
2. The use of changes facilitates the interpretation of the coefficients from the regression as the
explanatory variables are also changes.
3. An unexpected increase in the repo rate is defined as the announced repo rate exceeding the
expected repo rate.
4. The data period was 1
st May 1997 to 31
st December 1999. The daily LIBOR rates came from
DataStream, while the actual and expected monthly macroeconomic announcements were taken
from Standard and Poor’s Money Market Services. Expectations are generally surveyed one to
two weeks before the expected announcement. The expected changes in the repo rate were
supplied by Reuters, who conduct a monthly survey of the expectations of about 30 financial
institutions on the Thursday of the week before the scheduled MPC meeting. For each month the
mean forecast change in the variable was subtracted from the actual change, to give a measure
of the surprise. The meting dates of the MPC were supplied by the Bank of England.
5. For LIBOR, this refers to the next three months. For Short Sterling futures, this assumption
covers the next 3 to 6 months, depending on the maturity of the contract. 
6. Five days with very large errors were dummied out of this regression. These are 3
rd July 1997
(UK budget), 28
th August 1998, 16
th October 1998 (unexpected cut in US interest rates), 4
th
December 1998 and 1
st October 1999 (purchasing manager survey).
date have different implied volatilities  (i.e. the volatility term structure). Since the implied
volatility depends on the number of announcements scheduled to occur before expiry, the
implied volatility will generally be higher for contracts with a longer period until expiry.
This paper is a test of semi-strong market efficiency for the UK spot, futures and options
markets in short term interest rates. The reactions of the spot and futures markets are fully
consistent with semi-strong efficiency. It was found that, even if the volatility of the
underlying asset is unpredictable, the implied volatility of Short Sterling options is
predictable. While this means that movements in the implied volatility (and hence options
prices) are predictable, it does not conflict with semi-strong efficiency because there are
sound economic reasons for these patterns in implied volatility. Indeed, if the implied
volatility did not move in the predictable manner required by the scheduled
announcements, there would be a conflict with semi-strong efficiency. 
End Notes22
7. Suppose that, immediately before the MPC announcement, the market expects the MPC to
raise the repo rate from 4% to 5% at their next meeting and keep it there for at least the two
subsequent meetings. However, the MPC announces no change, and so there is a 1% surprise.
The market now expects the repo rate to be raised by 1% at either the next MPC meeting, or the
one after that. If these two possible outcomes are thought to be equally likely, the LIBOR rate
for the next three months following the failure of the MPC to raise the repo rate at their current
meeting is approximately [(4%+5%+5%)/3 + (4%+4%+5%)/3]/2 = 4.5%. In which case a 1%
surprise in the repo rate (due to the MPC not raising the repo rate by 1% at their current meeting)
leads to only a 0.5% drop in LIBOR from 5% to 4.5%.
8. This interest rate became the repo rate set by the MPC.
9. Changes in the current spot rate will directly alter the no-arbitrage price of Short Sterling
futures. Let the annual rate of return from lending money from now until three months after the
maturity of the Short Sterling future be RL (the long rate), the annual future spot return implicit
in the current price of the Short Sterling future be RF, and the annual rate of return from lending
money between now and the maturity of the futures contract be RS (the short rate). In a no-
arbitrage world, adjusted for the length of the holding periods, the return from using the long rate
must be the same as that from using the short rate and a Short Sterling future. By convention, the
price of Short Sterling futures is quoted as 100.00(1!RF) and so the no-arbitrage price (F) is
given by
F = 100{2![L/S]
365/n}
where S = (1+RS)
T/365, L = (1+RL)
(T+n)/365, T is the number of days to the maturity of the futures
contract and n is 3 months. The above equation shows that the no-arbitrage price of Short
Sterling futures is affected by changes in the ratio of RL to RS. Both these variables are directly
affected by the repo rate.
10. Since interest rates are altered with a tick size of 25 basis points, which exceeds arbitrage
transactions costs, the MPC announcements are generally expected to have an immediate effect
on the price of Short Sterling futures.
11. The daily closing futures prices were supplied by LIFFE.
12. By convention interest rate futures prices are quoted as 100.00(1!RF), where RF is the annual
future spot return implicit in the current price of the Short Sterling future. Therefore, an increase
in RF of 1% corresponds to a decrease in F of 1%, and so the repo rate is expected to have a
negative effect on the futures’ price.
13. Five days with very large errors were dummied out of this regression. These are 27
th and 28
th
August 1998, 16
th October 1998 (unexpected cut in US interest rates), 3
th December 1998 and
2
nd March 1999 (relaunch of the earnings series after previous errors). 
14. The scheduled announcements make volatility a function of time.
15. The term “implied volatility” will be used to refer to the variance implied by the options
price,  not the standard deviation.
16. This figure is drawn using the coefficients derived below in equation (13) and the variances
estimated as described in endnote 22.
17.This assumption is examined in section 3.E when hypothesis 8 is tested. It is assumed that the
sizes of the three types of anticipated volatility (%na
2, %a
2 and %b
2) are constant over time.23
18. For simplicity, it is assumed that MPC and other scheduled announcements do not occur on
the same day.
19. A simple numeric example illustrates this possibility of a perverse market reaction to the
resolution of uncertainty. Let kt = 5, mt = 1, nt = 4, %na
2 = 1, %a
2 = 5, %b
2 = 10. Then %t!1
2 = (mt%na
2
+ kt%b
2 + (nt+1)%a
2)/(Tt+1) = (1+50+25)/11 = 6.91, Y1t = mt/[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)] = 1/[6.91(110)] =
0.0013156, Y2t = kt/[%t!1
2(Tt(Tt+1)] = 5/[6.91(110) = 0.006578, , = (%na
2!%a
2) = (1!5) = !4 and
- = (%b
2!%a
2) = 10!5 = 5. Therefore, ,Y1t + -Y2t. = !4(0.0013156) + 5(0.006578) = + 0.02763.
20. As the contract nears expiry, volume drops and stale prices become more prevalent. This
biases the estimates of the implied volatility. In addition, as the option nears expiry and its price
becomes smaller, the tick size becomes more important, leading to unreliable results, Patel and
Wolfson (1981).
21. The implied volatilities were computed in the way described above.
22.The values of %na
2, %a
2 and %b
2 (on which x, y and z depend) were estimated using the errors
from fitting equation (2), but with rt = ln[(100-Ft)/(100!Ft!1)] as the dependent variable, rather
than !Ft. Logarithmic returns were used as the dependent variable so that the error terms could
be used to estimate the variance of the yield, as required by equation (3). The conclusions from
fitting this equation are the same as for equation (2). These errors were partitioned into three
non-overlapping subsets: MPC announcement, RPI announcement and no announcement days.
The average volatilities were then computed for each subset. The values of %t!1
2 are simply the
lagged daily implied volatilities.
23.  Since %t!1 appears in both the dependent and explanatory variables, any measurement error
will result in negative autocorrelation. Ederington and Lee (1996) included the lagged dependent
variable to control for negative autocorrelation when they estimated their version of equation
(12).
24. The observations for 20
th May 1997, 9
th July 1997, 21
st August 1997, 21
st August 1998, 27
th
August 1998, 28
th August 1998, and 15
th January 1999 were dummied out.
25. The observations mentioned in endnote 24 were dummied out.
26. Regressions of the same form as equation (14) but using absolute values also find no
relationship.
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